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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE BRITISH PERSPECTIVE ON INSOLVENCIES
RITISH attitudes to cross-border insolvency are a product of its
history and its legal and commercial culture. I shall start by list-
ing some of these and then go on to consider how they have affected
the law in Britain today. First, British bankruptcy law was formed
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when Britain was the
foremost trading nation in the world. The law therefore developed to
reflect the needs of a mercantile community in which the assets of an
insolvent trader might be situated in any part of the world. Secondly,
Britain was an Empire, composed of many countries with widely dif-
ferent legal systems but all subjects of the British Crown. Notwith-
standing the differences in legal systems, courts of the Empire were
expected to assist and cooperate with other courts and particularly
with the courts of the United Kingdom. The right to claim assistance
from courts in other jurisdictions and the duty to render assistance to
those courts has long been a part of the British system. Thirdly, insol-
vency has traditionally been seen as a system for the realization of the
debtor's assets in the interests of his creditors. In the hard competi-
tive world of the nineteenth century industrial revolution, bankruptcy
was a disgrace and the notion that it could be an instrument of reha-
bilitation for the debtor is a relatively recent development.
Fourthly, corporate debt financing has been provided either by the
issue of fixed interest debentures or, more commonly in this century,
by advances under facilities by banks. In either case, the debt has
been traditionally secured by a floating charge in favor of the deben-
ture holders or the banks over all the assets and undertaking of the
corporation. The floating charge is a remarkable invention of Victo-
rian equity lawyers which was designed to enable a company to trade
freely with its assets and at the same time to use those assets as secur-
ity for its fixed or bank debt. The instrument that creates the charge
entitles the creditor in the event of default to appoint a receiver with
wide powers to take possession of the whole of the corporation's as-
sets and to run the business as agent of the corporation. The powers
of the former management are suspended. The receiver is however an
agent whom the management of the corporation cannot dismiss and
* The Right Hon. Lord Hoffnann is a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary in the United
Kingdom. These remarks were given on April 4, 1996, at the 1995-96 Fordham Uni-
versity Graduate Colloquium: International Insolvencies.
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his primary duty is to realize the assets and goodwill of the corpora-
tion in the interest of the appointing creditor rather than the
stockholders.
The pervasiveness of the floating charge leads to a fifth characteris-
tic of British insolvency, which is that there is seldom any money left
over to pay unsecured creditors. The whole of the assets of the corpo-
ration are caught by the floating charge and applied for the benefit of
the debenture holders or more commonly the bank. This phenome-
non has caused a great deal of bitterness among unsecured creditors
and has been debated inside and outside Parliament for more than a
hundred years. The only steps that Parliament has taken have been to
require floating charges to be registered, so that persons dealing with
the company can in theory have notice of their existence, to avoid
floating charges granted within a year before insolvency, and to give
government creditors and employees certain preferential rights ahead
of the floating charge. It remains the norm that when the preferential
creditors, the expenses of the receivership, and the bank's debt have
been paid, there is nothing left for anyone else.
Sixthly, it is a further consequence of the floating charge that the
persons appointed as receivers have traditionally been accountants
rather than lawyers. The banks have regarded accountants as suitably
qualified to take charge of the conduct of the business and the realiza-
tion of the assets. The result is that British insolvency practitioners
are to this day almost entirely accountants who are, in their capacity
as receivers, used to having virtually unlimited powers over the assets
of insolvent corporations. Seventhly, the development of a rescue cul-
ture in Britain has been spearheaded by accountant insolvency practi-
tioners and conducted principally through the medium of receivership.
Banks have learned that more can be realized if the business is sold
quickly as a going concern rather than broken up. Even in cases in
which the breakup value would be sufficient to pay off the bank, the
odium which would be incurred from unsecured creditors and stock
holders, the protests of employees, and sometimes the threat of litiga-
tion, has helped to persuade banks to try to maximize the value of the
business.
This leads to the eighth point, which is that the British statutory
rescue procedure, which is called administration and is the nearest
thing in British law to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, is
modelled on receivership. Administration was introduced by the In-
solvency Act 1986 to enable rescue to take place in cases in which
there was no power to appoint a receiver or the creditor entitled to
appoint a receiver for some reason did not want to do so. The admin-
istrator is appointed by the judge for one or more of four statutory
purposes, which include the survival of the company or its business as
a going concern, the sanctioning of a plan of reconstruction, or the
more advantageous realization of the assets than would be effected on
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a liquidation. The administrator has full power to do anything which
may be necessary for the management of the affairs, business, and
property of the corporation. He must within three months make pro-
posals for how the statutory purpose is to be achieved and these are
put to a creditors' meeting. If they are successful, the administrator
will be discharged. If not, he will report failure to the court and will
usually be appointed liquidator instead. My ninth and last general
point is that receivers and administrators, like liquidators, are in-
dependent insolvency practitioners appointed by the creditors or the
court. British law has no equivalent to the debtor-in-possession under
Chapter 11, an institution which lawyers outside the United States
usually find rather puzzling.
II. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF BRITISH INSOLVENCY LAW
This background should be sufficient explanation to enable me to
turn to the international aspects of British insolvency law. At present,
an English court has jurisdiction to make a personal bankruptcy order
against anyone who is domiciled in England, who is present in Eng-
land when the order is made, who has been ordinarily resident there,
or who has carried on business there at any time within the previous
three years. The jurisdiction to wind up corporations is even wider.
The court may wind up any company registered in England and any
foreign company if there is sufficient connection between the com-
pany and England and there are persons who would benefit from the
order. It is therefore not even necessary for the purposes of jurisdic-
tion that there should be assets in England. This wide power may be
useful when the company is incorporated in a foreign tax haven like
Liberia or the British Virgin Islands and there are no known assets in
England, but the creditors hope that some may be unearthed by using
the inquiry procedures of the court against officers or directors or
bringing proceedings to set aside pre-bankruptcy preferences or fraud-
ulent disposals.
In a recent case,' the company was incorporated in the Channel
Island of Guernsey, which is a separate jurisdiction, not part of the
United Kingdom. It had no assets in England but owned property in
Portugal. The business appeared to have been conducted, however,
from the basement of an hotel in North London by a person resident
in England and the money that was owed to creditors had been bor-
rowed in England. The judge made a winding up order. Although the
court has this very wide jurisdiction, its exercise is discretionary and it
will not be exercised, even in respect of an English registered com-
pany, if there is another more appropriate jurisdiction in which the
company can be wound up. Jurisdiction to use the administration or




rescue procedure is rather narrower. Although there is some debate
on the point, it appears to be confined to companies registered in
England.
III. BRITISH RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN INSOLVENCY
PROCEEDINGS
A. General Approach
I move next to the English law on recognition of foreign insolvency
proceedings. In personal bankruptcy, English law has always recog-
nized the jurisdiction of foreign court to make a bankruptcy order
against anyone domiciled in its territory or who has submitted to the
jurisdiction. Furthermore, it has recognized that bankruptcy order as
operating worldwide to assign the debtor's moveable assets to his
trustee in bankruptcy. The foreign trustee in bankruptcy is entitled to
sue in England to recover the debtor's assets. This universalist theory
of personal bankruptcy has always been regarded by English courts as
mandated by international law and they have on occasion expressed
great surprise and vexation when some foreign courts have not been
correspondingly willing to recognize the title of an English trustee in
bankruptcy appointed to an English domiciled bankrupt.
It will be seen that the theory is to the advantage of an international
trading nation such as Britain was at the time it was developed. If
universally practiced, it enables the trustee of a bankrupt English
merchant to claim title to his goods in a warehouse in Bombay or his
ship in a harbor in New Zealand, leaving the local creditors to prove
concurrently with the English ones. On the other hand, the theory is
less advantageous to an underdeveloped country where few locally
domiciled businessmen will hold assets abroad. In such a case they
may prefer to keep the assets of the bankrupt foreign merchant for
local creditors. They will not be concerned with questions of reciproc-
ity because the trustees of local bankrupts will seldom need to call
upon the assistance of foreign courts. Britain was able to impose its
will upon the countries of the Empire but the United States clung ob-
stinately to a territorial theory of bankruptcy and did not give recogni-
tion to foreign bankruptcy proceedings or trustees. Worse still, some
South American states actually gave preference to local creditors over
foreign ones.
In addition to the common law conflicts rules of personal bank-
ruptcy by which the title of a foreign trustee is recognized, there have
long been statutory provisions for rendering assistance to other courts.
In the Bankruptcy Act 1914, which applied to the whole Empire as it
then was and which remained in force until 1986, any British court in
bankruptcy could call upon the assistance of any other British court.
The latter court had a duty to provide such assistance and had the
power to make any order which could be made in bankruptcy pro-
2510 [Vol. 64
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ceedings in its own jurisdiction or in the jurisdiction of the requesting
court.2
The position in relation to corporate insolvencies is less clear.
There is no doubt that British courts will recognize the right of a liqui-
dator or other court official appointed by a court in the territory of
incorporation to represent the company. But that leaves a number of
questions unanswered. First, the fact that a company is subject to in-
solvency proceedings in its place of incorporation does not prevent a
British court from making a winding-up order under the very broad
jurisdiction to which I have already referred. The fact that the com-
pany is already in liquidation in its home territory is merely a matter
affecting the discretion. English courts can wind up foreign compa-
nies that are not merely in bankruptcy proceedings in their home ter-
ritory but have even been dissolved and ceased to exist there. So in
the 1920s and 1930s the courts wound up several Russian banks that
had been dissolved by the Soviets. Secondly, it is not clear to what
extent a British court will recognize the position of a liquidator ap-
pointed by a country other than the territory of incorporation; for ex-
ample, a Chapter 7 liquidation in the United States of a company
registered in Liberia but carrying on business in New York. Thirdly,
there is the question of whether a British court will recognize not only
the title of the person who under the foreign bankruptcy law repre-
sents the company, but also the consequences of the commencement
of those proceedings. A good example is whether an English court
will pay any attention to the automatic stay that results from filing a
petition under Chapter 11. Fourthly, if there are bankruptcy proceed-
ings in respect of the same debtor in the foreign country and in Brit-
ain, to what extent will the British court cooperate with the foreign
bankruptcy?
Before addressing these points in general, I should say that on the
last question, namely, assistance between courts, the principle of the
right to cooperation, which in the days of the Empire applied between
British courts in cases of personal bankruptcy, has been extended to
corporate insolvency. The provisions are now in section 426 of the
Insolvency Act 1986. But the concept of a British court overseas has
gone with the Empire. Instead, there is a duty to assist the bankruptcy
courts in a list of countries contained in a Schedule to the Act, which
can be added to from time to time. At present the countries on the
list are the old Dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand,
the Republic of Ireland, and a collection of present or former colonies
like the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. The United States is not on
the list. As in the old bankruptcy law, the English court in giving
assistance to, for example, an Australian court, can make any order
that it could make under English bankruptcy law or any order which
2. Section 122 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914.
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the Australian court could have made under Australian bankruptcy
law. This produces what may seem to be slightly odd results. For ex-
ample, an English court was able to make an administration order in
respect of an Australian company. It decided that its own jurisdiction
applied only to English companies but it made the order because an
Australian court would have been able to do so.3
There is an interesting difference between the British technique of
dealing with requests for assistance from foreign courts and the corre-
sponding provisions in section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The
former creates a mandatory obligation to render assistance in respect
of a limited number of countries and leaves other cases to the com-
mon law or ad hoc arrangement. The latter applies without restriction
as to countries but is by no means mandatory. There is an elaborate
list of factors that the U.S. Bankruptcy Court has to take into account.
It is the British model which, as I shall mention later, has been fol-
lowed in the European Insolvency Convention. Its great advantage is
that it provides a measure of certainty to the liquidator or other of-
ficer who, through his own court, is attempting to enlist the assistance
of the British court. He knows that if his country is on the list, he will
be able to obtain such assistance quickly and cheaply, without elabo-
rate legal proceedings. It is often a feature of insolvency proceedings,
particularly if some form of rescue is being mounted, that every day
counts and that speed and certainty are vital if the business is to be
saved.
B. Cooperation Between British and United States Courts:
Felixstowe and Maxwell
The United States, as I have said, is not on the list. Cooperation
with British courts depends upon the common law and ad hoc ar-
rangements. I shall give two very well known illustrations of these
principles at work. The first was Felixstowe Dock and Railway Co. v.
U.S. Lines Inc.4 U.S. Lines was a shipping company carrying on busi-
ness all over the world. It owed money to the dock company at Felix-
stowe, a big container port in the east of England, and to similar
organizations in France, Holland, and other countries. It had money
in a bank account in England and some assets in France. It filed a
petition under Chapter 11 in the United States. The response of the
Felixstowe Dock company was to obtain an injunction to restrain the
company from moving its money out of England back to the United
States. U.S. Lines applied to Mr. Justice Hirst to discharge the injunc-
tion on the grounds that it was a violation of the worldwide automatic
stay which followed from filing the Chapter 11 petition and that all the
3. Re Dallhold Estates (U.K.) Ltd [1992] B.C.L.C. 394.
4. [1989] Q.B. 360.
[Vol. 642512
BRITISH PERSPECTIVE
company's assets should be administered in accordance with the
Chapter 11 reorganization.
The judge refused to discharge the injunction and kept the assets in
England. There has been a lot of criticism of this case, particularly in
the United States. Mr. Justice Hirst has been accused of insularity,
not showing comity, and not understanding the nature of proceedings
under Chapter 11, in spite of being sent a long essay by the U.S. judge
explaining in simple language how they worked. I am not sure that
these criticisms are fair. As a matter of private international law, all
that he was required to do was to recognize the title of the U.S. corpo-
ration to sue in respect of its injuncted assets. This gave rise to no
problem. The former management were now debtor-in-possession
under Chapter 11, but so far as the English court was concerned, they
still had title to act on behalf of the company in the same way as if
there had been no Chapter 11 proceedings. The question was whether
recognition should be given to the consequences in U.S. law of the
Chapter 11 petition. As a matter of U.S. law, the automatic stay oper-
ated worldwide. But that was no reason why an English court should
give it effect.
English courts are used to the extraterritorial pretensions of the
United States. In the field of antitrust law, the British parliament has
been driven to retaliate by legislation providing specifically that no
effect shall be given to such laws and that triple damages awarded by a
U.S. court shall be recoverable in English law. The purpose of such
extraterritoriality is often to advance and protect U.S. economic inter-
ests at the expense of those of other countries. Of course this is not
always the case. Quite often it is perfectly sensible that the whole of a
corporation's assets worldwide should be dealt with under a single sys-
tem of law and undesirable that creditors in one country should be
allowed to break ranks. Not long after Felixstowe I heard a case my-
self in which a U.S. creditor of a U.S. corporation in Chapter 11 in
Texas wanted an injunction to freeze assets of the corporation in Eng-
land. I refused the injunction, saying that fairness to all creditors re-
quired that he should participate in the reorganization in Texas. But
this was not the case in Felixstowe. The proposed scheme of reorgani-
zation was that the assets removed from England would be used to
keep U.S. Lines going in the United States but that it would withdraw
from the European market. This meant that the Felixstowe Dock
company would gain nothing from the reorganization. Furthermore,
it was clear that the French, who have a highly developed sense of
their own national interest, were for similar reasons not going to allow
any of the assets in France to be sent to the United States. The ques-
tion of whether to discharge the injunction was a matter of discretion
for the judge and in those particular circumstances, I am not surprised
that he thought it would be unfair to the English creditors if they had
to take their chance in the Chapter 11 reorganization.
1996] 2513
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The Felixstowe case was thought at the time to represent a low-
water mark in cooperation between the bankruptcy courts of the
United Kingdom and the United States. It seems to me that it was a
very special case which I, if I may so, would probably have decided in
exactly the same way and furthermore, as Mr. Justice Hirst remarked,
would probably have been decided in the same way in the United
States if the situation had been reversed.
A year or so later came the Maxwell Communications Corporation
bankruptcy, which is often regarded as showing a welcome reversal in
the attitudes of the British courts. I happened to be the judge in that
case and I can only say that I did not regard myself as doing anything
unusual or anything which my colleague Mr. Justice Hirst would not
have done. M.C.C. was a British company and most of its creditors
were British banks. But most of its assets were in the United States in
the form of subsidiary companies like Macmillan Publishing and Ber-
litz. After a period of unsuccessful negotiation with its banks, the
company petitioned for an administration order in England. I made
the order, but there was a dispute between the company and the
banks over who should be appointed administrator. Both candidates
were highly respectable accountants from huge international firms
and I decided in favor of the banks' nominees simply on the ground
that they had a running start because they had already put in
thousands of person/hours investigating the company's affairs during
the negotiations over the previous weeks. The company management
did not like this and went off to New York to petition under Chapter
11. They invited the New York judge to appoint an Examiner. They
hoped that this would block the attempts of the English administra-
tors to gain control of the U.S. assets. The judge appointed an Exam-
iner for the different and perfectly proper reason that she needed
someone independent to advise her in how to run the Chapter 11
proceedings.
The English administrators, who hoped to be able to dispose of the
U.S. subsidiaries as quickly as possible as going concerns, now found
that they had to deal with the U.S. Examiner. This was something of a
culture shock for them.- As I explained earlier, the English adminis-
trator is the descendant of the nineteenth-century receiver appointed
to take complete control of the whole of the company's assets and
business. He is used to going round to the offices or factory within an
hour of his appointment and taking charge. He has full powers to do
whatever he likes and although he is in theory the agent of the com-
pany, his duty even to provide information to the old management
before the termination of the receivership is practically zero. He can
5. For a view from the other side of the fence, see Evan D. Flaschen & Ronald J.
Silverman, The Role of the Examiner as Facilitator and Harmonizer in the Maxwell
Communications Corporation International Insolvency, in Current Developments in
International and Comparative Corporate Insolvency 621 (Jacob S. Ziegel, ed. 1994).
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employ the old management if he likes, but if he decides not to, he
simply collects the keys of their automobiles and leaves them to go
home on the subway. These powers enable an English administrator
to act with what in other jurisdictions might seem incredible speed.
When Barings Bank collapsed, the administrators were appointed on
Sunday night and had sold the bank, lock, stock, and barrel, nine days
later. The ability to act quickly enabled a good deal of the value of
the bank to be saved when otherwise it would have trickled away with
every hour of uncertainty. But in Maxwell the English administrators
found that they had to deal with an Examiner who was responsible to
a judge who in turn had to have regard to the various interest groups
who jockey for position in any Chapter 11 proceedings. Even the old
management, who would simply have been shown the door in Eng-
land, had their leverage which enabled them to keep a place at the
negotiating table.
The administrators therefore found that to get anything done-for
example, to raise interim finance to keep the subsidiary companies
going-required a great deal of expensive and time-consuming nego-
tiation. So they negotiated an overarching agreement with the Exam-
iner, rather grandly called the Protocol, which laid down general lines
of demarcation for running the proceedings on both sides of the At-
lantic with a view to avoiding delay and duplication of effort. The
New York judge had encouraged both the negotiation of the Protocol
and cooperation between the Examiner and the English
administrators.
The Protocol was brought before me for approval. I think it took
me about twenty minutes to read and approve it. I checked to see
whether it contained anything which looked like an obvious mistake.
Otherwise the chances are that I would have approved of whatever it
said. I certainly did not think of myself as giving effect to some unu-
sual form of cross-border insolvency cooperation. In this respect, it
seemed to me that my position was quite different from that of my
colleague in New York. I had appointed administrators in respect of
the whole company and it was their duty to take charge of the busi-
ness and collect the assets according to their professional judgment.
In English law they have full powers and although they report to a
meeting creditors and are in the end responsible for their actions, they
are subject to the very minimum of ongoing supervision by the court.
They are accountants, not lawyers, and have an experience in the
management of insolvent businesses that the court does not share.
Administrators are entitled, if they feel they are doing something unu-
sual, to protect themselves against subsequent complaints by asking
for the court's approval. But in general the attitude of the court is
that if the administrator's business judgment is that doing something
would be in the best interests of creditors, the court will accept that
judgment. So in this case, the administrators told me that they were
1996] 2515
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
having a difficult time in New York. Naturally they would have pre-
ferred simply to take charge of everything as they were used to doing
in England. That would have been quicker and cheaper. But they
had been advised that an attempt to terminate the Chapter 11 pro-
ceedings in New York would be expensive and delay matters without
necessarily being successful. So they felt that the interests of creditors
were best served by agreeing to the Protocol. In those circumstances,
it is hardly surprising that I approved. I think that any other English
judge would have done the same.
It may be fanciful to make comparisons, but I cannot help thinking
that the differences between Chapter 11 in the United States and in-
solvency proceedings in Britain resembles the differences between our
constitutions. The constitution of the United States has a clear sepa-
ration of the powers of three branches of government and an elabo-
rate system of checks and balances. There are many points at which
interest groups who do not want something to happen can stop it from
happening. Every step has to be negotiated. In Britain, the govern-
ment generally has complete control of the legislative process and the
courts have no power to review legislation. We have in effect a dicta-
torship between elections. In the early stages of a Parliament, a newly
elected government can do virtually anything it likes. It is only ac-
countable to the people at the end of its term. In the same way, a
British insolvency practitioner is put in charge of the business. He is
accountable to the creditors and the court only retrospectively after
his job has been done. In Chapter 11, I have the impression that the
management is, to use a striking image of Thomas Hobbes, like one
who goes to play tennis carried in a wheelbarrow.
The Protocol having been approved, the Maxwell case disappeared
from the English courts and the administrators got on with their job as
best they could. It reappeared on only two further occasions. One
was for the approval of the final scheme of reorganization and recon-
struction under both Chapter 11 and the scheme of arrangement pro-
visions of the British law. The other was an attempt by Barclays Bank
to persuade the English court to stop the administrators, who had
been recognized as the management for the purposes of being the
debtor in possession in New York, from using the provisions of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code to set aside a pre-bankruptcy repayment as a
preference. This was on any view a fairly pointless application be-
cause even if the English court did tell the administrators not to sue in
New York, the bankruptcy judge could have empowered the Exam-
iner to bring the proceedings on behalf of the company. In other re-
spects the case involved the application of general conflicts rules
about the circumstances in which courts will issue anti-suit injunctions,
of which English courts gained a good deal of experience during the
antitrust litigation brought by the liquidator of Laker Airways in the
1970s. But these principles are not peculiar to bankruptcy. They in-
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volve the general question of when it is appropriate for a court to
intervene in proceedings in another country by prohibiting a person
subject to its jurisdiction from bringing a suit there. The attitude of
the British courts, which I think is shared by those of the United
States, is that a court should not take such a step unless serious injus-
tice is otherwise likely to take place and that one should ordinarily
assume that the foreign court will not do anything which constitutes a
serious injustice. In this particular case,6 Barclays Bank were com-
plaining that it would be unfair if the avoidance provisions of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code were used against them because the arrangements
under which they had advanced money to the company and under
which they had been repaid had all been made in Britain. My deci-
sion, and that of the Court of Appeal, was that they should address
these arguments to the judge in New York. If it would constitute a
serious injustice for the U.S. bankruptcy judge to take jurisdiction
under the Bankruptcy Code, then no doubt she would not do so. But
the British court, even assuming that it had effective power to do so,
should not try to tell her when it would be unjust to apply U.S. law.
Perhaps I could sumimarize what I see to be the differences between
Felixstowe and Maxwell. In Felirstowe, the assets were in England but
there were no insolvency proceedings in England and no liquidator or
administrator to protect the interests of English creditors. The court
was being asked to put the interests of English creditors in the hands
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court supervising the reorganization. It re-
fused to do so. In Maxwell, the English court had appointed adminis-
trators to look after the interests of English creditors and the assets
were in the United States. In those circumstances the court approved
of the decision of the administrators to cooperate with the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court through its Examiner.
C. Cooperation in the European Union: The Proposed Bankruptcy
Convention
From cooperation between Britain and the United States I want fi-
nally to turn to cooperation between Britain and the other Member
States of the European Union. One of the objects of the European
Treaty is stated in Article 220 as being to secure the reciprocal recog-
nition and enforcement of the judgments of courts and tribunals. As
long ago as 1968, the then European Community signed what is
known as the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforce-
ment of judgments in civil and commercial matters. But that conven-
tion excludes the judgments of courts in bankruptcy.
For the past thirty years or so, the Member States of the European
Union have been trying to negotiate a Bankruptcy Convention. Their
first attempt was a very ambitious proposal to have a set of rules by
6. Barclays Bank plc v. Honzan [1992] B.C.C. 749.
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which only one Member State would have jurisdiction in any bank-
ruptcy. The orders of the court in that State would be effective in all
the others. But this proved completely unacceptable because no
Member State was willing simply to hand over the claims of its credi-
tors, particularly its government and preferential creditors, to the
bankruptcy rules and court of another country. For a long time, work
on the convention was abandoned. But a couple of years ago it was
resumed. At the end of last year a new draft Convention was ini-
tialled by the representatives of all Member States and opened for
signature. It has been signed by twelve out of the fifteen members of
the Union. The Government of the United Kingdom has not yet de-
cided whether to sign or not. A Committee of the House of Lords, of
which I happened to be Chairman, has just produced a report on the
Convention that is reasonably favorable but requires some doubtful
points to be cleared up in an explanatory memorandum that will ac-
company the Convention and be used as a guide to interpretation. In
theory, the three Member States who have not yet signed have to
make up their minds by the end of May, but I imagine that it may well
take rather longer. Then the Convention has to be ratified. So it may
be some time before it comes into force, if indeed it ever comes into
force at all.
The present draft Convention is not nearly so far reaching as the
first draft. It says that in every corporate insolvency the main pro-
ceedings shall take place in the country in which the corporation has
the "centre of its main interests." This is presumed to be the state of
incorporation until the contrary is proved. All other Member States
are obliged to recognize the orders of the court in which the main
proceedings are taking place and the liquidator, administrator, or
other officer appointed by that court, who may exercise all the powers
he has under the law of the State which appointed him in any other
Member State. Most of the questions that arise in a bankruptcy will
be determined by the law of the State in which the main proceedings
take place. There is, however, nothing to prevent the commencement
of insolvency proceedings in the courts of any other Member State in
which the corporation has what the Convention calls an "establish-
ment." An establishment will most obviously mean a place of busi-
ness, but the draft explanatory memorandum suggests that it will be
very widely interpreted. Such secondary proceedings can be started
by a creditor or by the liquidator or other officer appointed in the
main proceedings, for example, because he wants to use procedures of
interrogation available through the courts of another state. If secon-
dary proceedings are started in another State, they will apply only to
assets situated within that State. In respect of those assets, however,
the local law will apply to most of the issues which arise.
I can best explain how it is supposed to work by giving an example.
Take an insolvent French company that is the subject of main pro-
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ceedings in France. It has a factory in England and a bank account in
Frankfurt. One of the directors, whom the French liquidator would
like to question about what has happened to some of the assets, is
living in Italy. Employees at the English factory can, if they wish, start
secondary proceedings in England. If they do, the English assets will
be subject to the English law of insolvency and the employees will get
the limited preferential rights in those assets to which they are entitled
in English law. If no one starts any secondary proceedings in Ger-
many (and the mere presence of a bank account in Frankfurt would
not seem to amount to an establishment sufficient to give jurisdiction
to start such proceedings) then the German courts are obliged to give
effect to the French bankruptcy and hand over the money to the
French liquidator. If there are any German creditors, they must go
and prove in France. English creditors, on the other hand, can all
prove in the English proceedings and if the English assets are not suf-
ficient, the English liquidator will hand over their claims to his French
colleague. As for the director in Italy, the French liquidator can ap-
parently go there and exercise whatever powers of interrogation he
may have under French law.
The view of insolvency practitioners in Britain, as given in evidence
to the House of Lords Committee, was that the Convention is likely to
be helpful. It does mean that an insolvency practitioner who is ap-
pointed liquidator or administrator of a British company can obtain
quick and cheap recognition of his position in all other Member States
in which secondary proceedings have not been commenced and a min-
imum of cooperation from the court appointed officers in those in
which they have. On the other hand, companies of any size which
operate in more than one Member State usually do so, not through
branches but through locally incorporated subsidiaries or associated
companies. The Convention has nothing to say about recognition of
insolvency proceedings in respect of associated companies except, for
what its worth, the right of the liquidator of a parent company to be
entitled to control its stockholding in a foreign subsidiary. So this im-
mediately reduces the practical value of the Convention. If one takes
the common example of a British company with a German subsidiary
or vice versa, each buying and selling stock items from the other as
part of an integrated business and linked by cross guarantees of the
same debt, the Convention does nothing to help the administrator or
liquidator of either company in trying to rescue them both as a going
concern rather than breaking them up. As now, it will depend upon
ad hoc negotiation between the insolvency practitioners in the two
countries.
The general principles of the Convention are however to be wel-
comed. On the one hand, within the limits of its operation, it provides
certainty. Recognition and cooperation follow as of right and do not
have to be litigated or negotiated. On the other hand, it does not
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achieve certainty at the expense of sacrificing the interests of creditors
in any country in which there are sufficient assets to count as an estab-
lishment. Such creditors are entitled to their own secondary proceed-
ings and the operation of their own law.
CONCLUSION
Are there any general conclusions to be drawn from the British ex-
perience in cross-border insolvency? Perhaps there are three. First,
we do not see a role for judges and the judicial process in the early
stages of rescue or liquidation. At this stage, the law can do little
except impose obstacles to a quick business solution. We think that
the right answer is to appoint someone to represent those interests
which are common to all creditors and indeed stockholders and em-
ployees, namely to preserve the business and realize its maximum
value. The time for lawyers is afterwards, when the business has been
saved or sold and priorities in the proceeds have to be adjusted. In
this field, it is better to have a few cases in which mistakes are made
than to impose expense and delay on everyone. Secondly, we think
that cooperation between jurisdictions should be rapid and a matter of
right rather than discretion. Again, we think that the role of judges
should at this stage be as limited as possible. But this inevitably
means that the kind of cooperation provided should be modest and
limited to whatever can be done without damaging the ultimate rights
of local creditors. Because thirdly and finally, we think it is unrealistic
to require the courts of one country, however well disposed to those
of another, to act in a way which is manifestly to the prejudice of its
own creditors. The courts of the United States do not do so, nor do
we, and the European Convention is designed, subject to a certain
amount of give and take, to avoid compelling any Member State to do
SO.
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